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notice appears on all such copies.    The food sector is undergoing a fundamental transformation in response to changing 
consumer demand that is the shift away from the agricultural commodities with 
standard quality specifications to agricultural ingredients with non-standard 
specifications. Consequently, there is an increasing concern about acquiring quality 
inputs among processors.  The use of contracts to respond to this increasing demand for 
quality among consumers has become common practice in many agricultural sectors 
(Cook and Chaddad, 2000). To solve the apparent quality measurement problems 
between processors and independent growers that universally plague these relationships, 
the majority of contracts use incentives schemes to incentive growers to produce 
quality.  
In fact, many studies of incentive contracts have empirical support for the 
prevalence of incentive contracts to encourage growers to produce greater level of 
quality over the spot market. Among the existing studies, Curtis and McCluskey (2003) 
analyze a sample of production contracts between potato processors and growers in the 
Columbia Basin area of Washington and Oregon. The authors conclude that contracts 
are effective at increasing potato load quality over the spot market alternative. In a 
recent paper, Alexander, Goodhue and Rausser (2007) examine an unusual dataset 14 
tomato growers over 4 years to analyze the effect of incentive contracts on behaviour. 
They find that the processor obtains higher quality tomatoes from contracting than from 
spot purchases because growers respond to price incentives for quality.  
The previous contributions have provided empirical support for the prevalence of 
incentive contracts to encourage growers to produce greater level of quality over the no 
contract alternative, which raises questions about the viability of spot markets in the 
future. One of the earliest formulations of co-existence of spot and contract markets in 
agriculture can be found in Xia and Sexton (2004). In their model, they analyzed the impact of “top-of-the-market” contract clauses on the intensity of competition in the 
market in a duopsony model.  In related work, Carriquiry and Babcock (2004) analyzed 
the impact of many buyers and sellers on a market equilibrium characterized by co-
existence. They concluded that co-existence of both markets only arose in presence of 
uncertainty. Finally, Hendrikse (2007) found co-existence in a model of endogenous 
contract formation and endogenous uncertainty. His results established that contracts 
arise due to the costs associated with a spot market, regardless of the heterogeneity of 
buyers and the uncertainty of supply. 
While the previous contributions have considerably enhanced our understanding of 
co-existence, they suffer from an important limitation. Although there is an increasing 
demand for food quality, quality issues are not introduced in their models of 
coexistence. Taking into account that one of the determinants of contracts is quality 
(Goodhue et al., 2003; Hueth and Ligon, 1999a, b, 2001, 2002), it cannot be presumed 
that conclusions of previous literature remain stable in differentiated product markets. 
Hence, a fully satisfactory theory is yet to be developed.  
To fill this gap, the purpose of this paper is to examine theoretically whether the co-
existence of incentive contracts and spot market can emerge as an equilibrium outcome 
in a differentiated market. By taking into account quality issues, we take a further step 
towards understanding the market settings when contracts and spot exchanges coexist.  
Using a simulation exercise, we prove that co-existence of incentive contract and 
spot market is quite natural in differentiated markets. While such a conjecture is 
apparent in the intuitions underlying many earlier models, we prove it formally, as 
resulting from the optimizing behaviour on the part of the agents.  
The paper is organized as follows. The following section outlines the basic 
framework. Then we characterize the static equilibrium structures using the Nash equilibrium concept and discuss the various implications of the different structures with 
a simulation exercise. A summary and concluding remarks are in the final section.  
 
The basic framework 
The proposed methodology for studying the contractual problems is based on the 
maximization problems of the primary producers and the processing industry, 
respectively. Various assumptions can be made with respect to the market and the 
organizational structure.  
We consider a regional area in which M identical upstream producers or growers 
(k:1…M) supply the essential input used by N identical processors (i:1…N) in a 
regional area. We suppose that one unit of input is needed to produce one unit of output 
and there is no other input. Likewise, inputs from different producers will yield a final 
product whose quality is a weighted average of the quality of its inputs. That is, we 
assume for simplicity that the processor doesn’t add value to the product and likewise 
that there are no processing costs.  
The processors, risk-neutral, are quantity-setting (Cournot) competitors, producing a 
differentiated product. The differentiation can be vertical and horizontal. In general, 
market prices are higher for high-quality than for lower quality goods. Likewise, prices 
and yields appear to be inversely related in the aggregate market (see for example Beard 
and Thompson, 2003). Although some of our analysis can be carried out by using a 
general functional form for the price, the exposition is significantly improved if a 
specific functional form is used. To improve the exposition, we assume that the inverse 
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3 2 1    i=1..N  Where Pi is the price of the output, Qi is the quantity and Si denotes the quality of 
the output of processor i. Likewise, b1, b2 and b3 represent, respectively, the own market 
specific quality effects, and the own and each rival market specific supply effects with 
bh>0  h=1…2.  
Following Carriquiry and Babcock (2004), it is assumed that producers are risk-
neutral
2. Each producer decides his level of quantity, q, and quality, s . As is 
traditionally the case in models of this kind (see, e.g. Champsaur and Rochet, 1989; 
Giraud-Héraud, Soler and Tanguy, 1999), we assume constant marginal production 
costs regardless of volume and that the cost varies quadratically in line with the level of 
quality as follows:  ()
2
2 , qs c s q C = , with c>0.  
Each processor can acquire his input in the spot market or by offering an incentive 
contract to a grower. We assume that the incentive contract is exclusive, that is, a 
processor can only contract with a producer and vice verse. Moreover, if a producer 
accepts the incentive contract, he can not supply his input at the spot market
3. 
Following the previous literature in agency theory (for example, Stiglitz,1974; 
Holmström and Milgrom, 1979, 1987) and guided by empirical evidence, we consider 
that the structure of the incentive contract is linear in the observed processor´s revenue 
This implies a two-part compensation scheme consisting of (i) a fixed payment,α , that 
is independent of the observed revenue, and (ii) an incentive payment that amounts to a 
positive share,β , of the observed revenue.  
We do not consider the optimal allocation of land ownership between the grower 
who works with land directly and his intermediary who processes and sells the growers´ 
output in some downstream market because it does not affect the total join certainty 
equivalent.          Our  formulation  of  the  models
4 implicitly recognizes the law of supply and 
demand for both raw material and finished product, that is, the volume demanded will 
be equivalent to the volume supplied in the regional area.  
 
The structure of the game 
As we mentioned earlier, the main objective of this paper is to determine the 
equilibrium governance mechanism in the vertical relationship. To this end, we consider 
a two-stage game. In the first stage, the processors, simultaneously, decide whether to 
offer an incentive contract or to remain at the spot market. Following to Hendrikse 
(2007), processors in contracts are not allowed to trade on the spot market. They take 
their decisions based on the anticipated expected profits resulting from the second stage. 
In the second stage, the processor´s problem depends on the governance mechanism 
structure which results from the first stage.  
There are three possible structures of governance forms in this second stage. In the 
first, denoted by non incentive contract structure, both growers and processors operate 
independently at the spot market. Producers set a price for the input, which processors 
buy at the spot market, transform it into output and compete in quantities in the 
downstream market. The growers, simultaneously, decide on their effort to produce 
quality input and quantity input. In doing so, they face the derived demand for the input 
derived from the decisions of the processors. In the downstream stage, the processors 
simultaneously decide on the quantity of the output, taking as given the price of the 
input and the consumer demand for the output. 
In the second structure, denoted by asymmetric incentive structure, some pairs 
processor-grower remain at the spot market and other pairs set an incentive contract. In 
each incentive contract, the processor delegates the quantity and quality decisions to his contracting grower and determines the compensation scheme: w=α+βy, where α and β 
are constant, β≥0, and y is the processor´s revenue. The processor selects α so that the 
grower gets only his reservation utility. We assume that the grower accepts any 
incentive contract that gives him a payoff at least as great as what he would get in his 
best alternative, that is, what he would obtain if he remained in the spot market.  
Finally, in the third structure, denoted by symmetric incentive structure, each 
processor sets an incentive contract with a grower. The continuation game proceeds in 
the same way that in the incentive contract of the previous structure.   
 
Processor i 




      
Grower k 
Offer 




Not  Accept 
Remain at the 
spot market   
Accept 
 
                    FIGURE 1: The basic structure of the game 
 
The expected profits of the structures 
We are interested in characterizing the subgame-perfect Nash-equilibria. As usual, we 
solve the game by backward induction.  Following Hendrikse (2007), we have taken the number of processors to be equal to 
the number of growers, that is, N=M. This assumption is made for the purpose of 
allowing each processor to have possibility to set an incentive contract with a grower.  
Case (i): Non-incentive contract structure 
We solve first the structure where all processors acquire their input at the spot 
market prices. The analysis is symmetrical for all processors. We denote by qij the 
quantity of input acquired by processor i from the grower k, i=1…N, k=1…M. We solve 
the subgame by backward induction. Then, we start from second stage 2, in which given 
the input prices, pk, processor i choose his quantity to maximize his profits, . A 
processor´s profit is the revenue generated minus the total cost paid:  
M
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Taking the first-order necessary condition for a maximum in (2) yields:  

















Aggregation of (3) across the demands for producer k from the processors yields: 














                       
The grower k´s problem for the derived demand (4) is to choose this effort in quality 
and quantity to maximize his profit  :  
M
k π(5)   
2
, 2
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Upon expanding the above expression, the following is obtained:  




























π                
Maximizing (6) with respect to qk and sk, a system of two equations with two unknowns 
is obtained:  
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Since processors and growers face common equations, without loss of generality, in 
what follows we omit the subscripts i and k in the variables. From the first order 
conditions of this problem, we get the equilibrium values
5 of the input, s* and q*.   
Case (ii): Asymmetric incentive contract structure 
We assume that n pairs of processors (i:1...n) and growers (k:1…n) decide to offer 
an incentive contract and N-n processors (i:n+1…N) and growers (k: n+1…M) remain 
at the spot market.  
To determine the profits of each processor, we must simultaneously consider the 
processors´ problems in the incentive contract and in the spot market to solve the 
reaction functions.  
In the incentive contract, the processor i chooses the parameters of the incentive 
scheme, αi and βi, to maximize his profit subject to the constraints that the grower 
chooses his efforts in quantity and quality to maximize his utility (incentive restriction) 
and that the grower attains at least his reservation utility (participation restriction) , i.e.,  
(8)                                i i i
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The grower´s reservation utility in the previous structure is the profit that he would 
obtain in the spot market with N-n+1 participants (upstream and downstream) and the 
rest of participants setting incentive contracts.  
The optimization problem in equations (8)-(10) can be solved sequentially. First, the 
optimal solutions to the grower´s decision on efforts in quantity and quality in equation 
(9) are obtained:  















































β α π            
Since processor i (i:1…n) only contracts with a grower, grower k (k:1…n), it is obvious 
that Qi=qk and Si=sk. Making these substitutions it is obtained that,    















































β α π            
Optimizing, we obtain:  















































          














                
Parellally, in the spot market we proceed in the same manner as in the previous case. 


















which, after substitutions, gives  
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Optimization of this equation yields:  
(16)                      ∑ ∑∑ ∑
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Aggregation of (16) across the demands for grower k from the processors in the spot 
market yields:  
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The grower k´s problem in the spot market for the derived demand (17) is to choose his 
effort in quality and quantity to maximize his profit  :  
M
k π


















− = π                      
Upon expanding the above expression, the following is obtained:  
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Maximizing (19) with respect to  and  , a system of two equations with two 
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By symmetry we omit the subscripts i and k in equations 12a, 12b, 20a, 20b and 





IC=f(β). Then, we substitute these values into equation (8) and (10) and maximizing 
with respect to β the optimal incentive is obtained. Finally, we calculate  ,  , 






Case (iii): Symmetric incentive structure 
Consider now the case when all processors offer an incentive contract, that is 
processor i, i=1…N offers an incentive contract to grower k, k=1…M. We first 
determine the grower k´s reservation utility, which is the profit from the grower at the 
spot market with successive monopoly.  
We proceed in the same manner as in the incentive contract of the case (ii). First, we 
solve the incentive rationality of the grower k:  
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which, after substitutions, gives 
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The optimal solutions to this problem are:  
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                Since processors and growers face common equations, without loss of generality, in 
what follows we omit the subscripts k and j in the variables. Substituting the values of q 
and s obtained in (23a) and (23b) in processor’s problem and in grower’s compatibility 
constraint, and maximizing with respect to β the optimal incentive is obtained. It is easy 
to check
6 that β=1, which is consistent with the prediction made by the standard 
principal-agent model when the agent is risk-neutral. Finally, we calculate  , and 
and substitute them into grower’s participation restriction  to obtain the optimal 





Equilibrium industry structure 
Having determined the processor´s expected profits in each structure, we proceed 
now to find their equilibrium strategies. So far, we analyzed competitive behaviour in a 
two-stage game with N processors and M growers. We assume all firms make their 
entry decision simultaneously; although this clearly raises some questions about the 
exact nature of the entry process, the identification of viable supply-chain structures and 
characterization of Nash equilibria that it allows is useful. 
The strategy space for processor i at first stage is given by φi: ={0,1}, where the 
strategy si=1 if and only if the processor sets an incentive contract.   We do not care 
exactly which processor sets an incentive contract, only how many do so, as they are 
symmetric. Therefore, we can focus on the number of processors with incentive 
contract, n= and the number of processors in the spot market, N-n. Any pair (n, N-







Let   the profit obtained by processor i in the incentive contract in a 
structure with n pairs of processor-grower in the Incentive Contract and the rest in the 
( n N n
IC
i − , π )Spot Market.  Similarly,   define the profit obtained by processor i in the 
spot market in the previous structure.  
( n N n
M
i − , π )
Our solution concept is the (Nash) equilibrium of the above game. A structure 
integrated by n processors with incentive contract and N-n in the spot market, (n, N-n), 
is an equilibrium such that for all i,  
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No processor could be strictly better off by unilaterally reversing his decision 
whether or not to set an incentive contract in an equilibrium structure.   
In the next subsection we characterize the equilibrium structures of the industry for 
different number of processors and growers.   
 
Characterization of the static equilibrium 
Here, we carry out a simulation exercise to calculate the equilibrium structure 
industry for a wide range of number of growers and processors in an attempt to 
investigate whether the co-existence of incentive contract and spot market is an 
equilibrium structure under diverse conditions.  
In order to undertake the simulation exercise, we consider the following initial 
values: b1=1, b2=0.00001, b3=0.0001 and c=0.4. It should be noted that these initial 
values are used for convenience and has no special significance here and that simulation 
results do not change substantially if different values for b1, b2, b3 and c are used.  
This analysis is used to provide explanations for several contractual structure related 
issues, such as the co-existence of incentive contracts and spot market. However, before 
proceeding, we should note the caveat that this simulation exercise uses restrictive 
assumptions about the shapes of price and cost functions. Although these seem highly plausible to us for most situations, there may be situations which are not covered by our 
simulations.  
Then, we have two free parameters in our model: the number of growers, M, and the 
number of processors, N. It may be worth noting here that an unmatched pair is not a 
player. Hence, we directly consider an identical number of processors and growers, 
varying from 1 to 50, in steps of 1.  
Figure 1 graphically depicts the equilibrium structure (n, N-n) for each value of N. 
The horizontal axis corresponds to the number of participants in the sector, N. The 
vertical axis corresponds to the number of participants in incentive contract, n, and the 
number of them at the spot market, N-n, that would result in an equilibrium structure 
using the equilibrium concept defined above.  

















Incentive Contract    Spot Market 
        Figure 1:   Equilibrium structures with N processors and M Growers (N=M) 
Figure 1 shows that for each case of N used in the simulation, there is a unique 
equilibrium
7 structure. That is, for a given size of the market, there is a unique structure 
in which no processor has an incentive to unilaterally reverse his decision whether or 
not to set a contract. We discuss the types of equilibrium structures by dividing the 
graph into two areas. Each region is marked with a number. In the region 1, which 
represents the cases in which N<22, each processor has an incentive to set a contract 
(the dominant strategy for each processor is to set a contract) and as a result a completely incentive contract structure emerges as an equilibrium structure. When the 
number of participants increases, the degree of competitiveness changes and it may 
offer an advantage to remain at the spot market. In particular, when the number of 
participants in the upstream and downstream stage is larger than 21, then asymmetric 
incentive contract structures are the unique equilibrium structures. Basically, in these 
cases the majority of processors choose the incentive contract and a minority remains at 
the spot market. This result would demonstrate numerically the possibility of co-
existence of both vertical structures.  
This finding is consistent with previous literature that has demonstrated that the co-
existence of spot and contract markets is quite natural. But there are also some 
differences. Unlike the result found by Carriquiry and Babcock (2002), who concluded 
that uncertainty had to be explicitly accounted for in any modeling situation in which 
contracts and spot markets co-exist and production outcomes are subject to randomness, 
we find that co-existence can emerge regardless of the uncertainty.  
It is worth emphasizing, that our model assumes that all the market participants, 
growers and processors, are risk-neutral. Hence, the equilibrium outcomes are the 
results of purely financial considerations (Xia and Sexton, 2004).   
For completeness, we now evaluate if the equilibrium structure is the optimal 
structure considering the total profit.  
Figure 2 shows the structure (n, N-n) that would optimize the total profit for each 
value of N. Similar to the figure 1, the horizontal axis represents the number of 
participants in the sector, N. The vertical axis corresponds to the number of participants 
in incentive contract, n, and the number of them at the spot market, N-n, that would 
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  Incentive Contract    Spot Market 
        Figure 2:   Optimal structures with N processors and M Growers (N=M) 
 
In all cases analyzed in this simulation exercise, the equilibrium structure does not 
coincide with the optimal structure. In fact, the results suggest that they are antagonic. 
While the equilibrium structures are characterized by incentive contracts majoritarily 
(see figure 1), the optimal structures are formed by spot market essentially (see figure 
2).   
 
Conclusions 
Agricultural economists have been active in examining the rationale for the increasing 
use of contracts between growers and processors and in identifying the implications of 
this mechanism. Little attention, however, has been paid to the co-existence of spot and 
contract markets, a common feature in many agricultural markets.  
In particular, the possible co-existence of structures that can emerge in the presence 
of quality issues with a number of growers and processors in each stage is something 
that has largely remained an open question in the literature. This paper is an attempt to 
fill this void.  
In this study we consider a quality-differentiated agrarian sector in which there are 
two potentially separable levels of production: primary production by growers and 
secondary production by processors. In this setting, how is the equilibrium structure determined? To answer this question, we use a straightforward two-stage Cournot 
oligopoly model with specific demand and cost functions. In the first stage, processors 
decide simultaneously whether or not to set an incentive contract. The second stage is 
the stage in which growers choose their levels of quantity and quality based on the 
industry structure developed in the first stage. With the help of numerical simulations 
we conducted the study of the equilibrium structures. Our results suggest that for a wide 
range of number of participants in both markets, participation in both markets 
constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the model. This result would indicate that the fact 
that a growing proportion of agricultural inputs are transacted by contracts does not 
necessarily imply that spot markets for these sectors will disappear altogether.  
This paper provides an interesting implication from an agricultural policy 
perspective. Our results suggest that the equilibrium structure does not mean optimality 
considering the total profit. Therefore, policy makers could consider some measures to 
lead participants to choose the optimal structure.  
On balance, this paper suggests that, under successive oligopoly, the co-existence of 
both markets is quite natural in differentiated markets. This result is consistent with the 
empirical evidence. However, the generality of this basic insight requires a few 
comments.  
First, all processors and growers are assumed identical. On the basic of previous 
work, for example Hendrikse (2007), it seems reasonable to conjecture that the 
possibility of including heterogeneous participants would not influence our qualitative 
results. However, the analytical difficulties associated with this issue would increase 
considerably. A similar remark holds for relaxing the assumption that growers are risk-
neutral.   Second, our results depend on the way we model the market interaction between the 
processors with incentive contract and the processors at the spot market. We must 
emphasize that the possibility of processors with an incentive contract buying at the spot 
market is not considered in this paper. However, processors might choose to purchase 
their inputs from independent upstream producers for strategic reasons, for example, to 
raise the rivals´ input cost. Then, an interesting topic for future research could be to 
allow processors with an incentive contract to freely trade with independent upstream 
producers and analyse if the raising-rivals´ costs strategy influences the nature of 
incentive contract equilibria. 
Agricultural markets exhibit a rich variety of governance structures, such as vertical 
integration or cooperatives (Hendrikse, 2007). Then, a different direction in which this 
research could be extended is to explore whether co-existence also attains for other 
contractual arrangements.   
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